Alexandria and the Stoic-influenced school of Pergamon. The school of Alexandria championed the mode of analogy, while the rival school of Pergamon espoused the mode of anomaly. The Greek analogy means "equality of ratios," while anomaly means a "disproportion of ratios." Whereas the analogists of Alexandria held that the literary text was a unity and had a fixed meaning, the anomalists of Pergamon in effect asserted that the literary text was an interplay of differences and had meanings that arose out of those differences.5
Bloom's strong claim is very suggestive for the study of midrash, for we find the battle between Alexandria and Pergamon repeated in more than one way in the midrash-not literally, but typologically.6
The famous example of such a theoretical clash in rabbinic literature is the controversy between R. Ishmael and R. Aqiba as to whether the Torah has spoken in the language of men or in a special language of God. The battle turned largely on halakhic issues and has been extensively explored by scholars.7 What has not been noticed is that there is (on a smaller scale, to be sure) a similar conflict over the interpretation of narrative (that is aggadic) texts in the Mekilta, or rather in a particular sub-division of that text, Tractates Way- Four times in Tractate Wayyasa, at least, R. Yehoshua makes interpretive statements which seem understandable only as rejections of the views of the other tannaim.'0 The reason for reading them in this way, in spite of the paradoxical fact that in this midrash the view of R. Yehoshua is always presented first, is that, seen by themselves, they are vacuous or tautological interpretations. Seen as refutations of the opposing view, however, each one reads as a strong rejection of the "anomalous" reading. Such interpretations are "privative," as they exist to deny an opposing reading.1 Since the gesture is repeated four times or more in the space of this rather circumscribed text, it seems to amount, at the very least, to a claim by the redactor of the midrash that R. Yehoshua was an "analogist" who "held that the text was a unity and had a fixed meaning."
The most obviously privative position of R. Yehoshua's in our text is his rejection of a reading of R. El'azar's which involves several midrashic techniques. Among the techniques which the latter adopts here are ma'al (paronomasia, the substitution of one word for a similar one by revocalizing it); anagrammatic reading; notariqon (reading as if a shorthand writer had written, i.e., taking a word as a series of abbrevia-9 Loewe did notice a similar sort of consistent disagreement between the later (amoraic) authorities, Rav and Shmuel (173), so it is even more surprising that he did not see the patterning of the views of Rabbis Yehoshua and El'azar Hammoda'i, all the more so since he did cite one example of it on p. 171. 10 The technical term for such a private statement in rabbinic literature is lehosi mr. ploni ba = He has come to exclude the view of R.X. " Once again, Loewe has perceived this pattern with reference to other series of disgreements between 'literalists' and their opponents and has not picked it up in our case. I believe that my term, "privative" is far superior to his "apologetic." There is no question of apology here, but it is natural that the position that the text should be read in a simple fashion will be the reactive one. Moreover, I would like to point out that the fact that the simple interpretation appears first does not contradict its privativity, contra Loewe (172), vis a vis Rav and Shmuel (cf. n. 9 above), as our examples here clearly show. "Fine" teaches us that it was fine. "Scale-like" teaches us that it was scale-like. "Like frost" teaches us that it would fall like hoar-frost upon the ground. These are the words of R. Yehoshua. They must both be considered possibilities in the sequel as well, where the tree which God shows them is read as "words clear that this group read the verse in a metaphorical way, either in place of the concrete reading or in addition thereto. It may very well be that in its original context, R. Yehoshua's statement, "kishmu'o" was intended to reject this ancient allegory, and not the simple gap-filling of his fellow tannaim. In the present Mekiltan context, R. Yehoshua appears to reject both approaches.
In another case, there is no ambiguity as to what reading it is that R. Yehoshua is rejecting by his "according to its sound." "Tomorrow I will stand at the top of the hill (Ex. 17:9)": R. Yehoshua said, tomorrow we will be standing at the top of the hill-according to its sound. R. El'azar Hammoda i says, tomorrow we will declare a fast and be prepared with the deeds of our ancestors. "Top": these are the deeds of the fathers. "Hill": these are the deeds of the mothers.
R. El'azar has made the verse conform to his theological vision of the whole narrative, as reflecting the reward by God to an undeserving people by virtue of the merits of their ancestors.2 His reading is typically
of Torah" by these same interpreters. In other words, we can easily understand (contra Lauterbach, cf. previous note) that what the dorshe reshumot wish to say is that the tree was a real tree, but its value is to be interpreted symbolically. There is, accordingly, no definitive proof that the interpretation of the dorshe reshumot denies the reality of the events. The 17th century neo-Aramaic midrash recently published by Yona Sabar understands this to mean that there were two events, the "Mixed Multitude" rebelled and complained about water, but the rest of the People were really thirsty for Torah. midrashic, and perhaps reflects ancient tradition,28 and R. Yehoshua rejects it summarily, arguing again that the language is to be interpreted "according to its sound,"-univocally, literally, mimetically. In the light of R. Yehoshua's repeated rejection of ma'al and notariqon and in the light of his explicit repeated use of the term kishmu'o, we may consider his hermeneutic differences with his colleagues to have originated in what Bloom has termed an "analogical" theory of language. Now the term, "according to its sound" is not exclusive to R. Yehoshua even in our document. Its other occurrences both relate, however, to proper names. Thus we find once R. Eliezer himself interpreting that the place-name Refidim is to be taken as only that-in opposition to a view that it means "laxity," by a punning notariqon.29 R. Yehoshua, therefore, has 28 It is reflected in the Palestinian Targum to this verse, but it may be that R. El'azar's comment is the source of that translation. 
